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SOME PROBLEMS ARISING FROM GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS
By 0. R. McGuiE -
The use of the corporate device as a means of executing functions of
the Federal Government has grown considerably through the years. Al-
though the device is not new in this country,1 recent years have seen a much
more extensive use of it.2 This paper will be devoted to suggestions of
constitutional problems and a discussion of the legal status of some of the
more important government corporations in particular situations. Although
there is comparatively little literature or case law 3 on the subject, neverthe-
less, it represents such an important element in our modern form of govern-
ment that an indentation must be made somewhere.
Government corporations have been created either by direct act of
Congress, by act of the executive establishing the corporation under a
state incorporation law, or by purchase by the Government of all of, or a
controlling interest in, a private corporation, thereby transforming it into
a government corporation.
Shortly after the Revolution the Federal Government created by its
own charter the Bank of North America and later the First and Second
Banks of the United States. However, inasmuch as the Government did
not control or manage these corporations, or hold a majority of the stock,'
they should not strictly be classed as government corporations. Likewise
national banks 5 and railroads 6 which have been incorporated by Congress
should be classed as private corporations, because the management is in
private individuals and the corporations are operated for profit.7 The first
corporation really resembling the New Deal corporations was the Panama
Railroad Company which was acquired by the Federal Government in
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19o4.8 The United States bought nearly all of the stock of the Company
and has operated it ever since. The Company was originally incorporated
under the laws of the State of New York in 1849 and operates as such today.,
The stock of the Alaska Northern Railway Company was acquired by
virtue of an act authorizing the President to locate and operate railroads
in Alaska.10 This corporation has been held to be a government corporation
and also a government department, possessing the attributes of sovereignty
of the United States."
Beginning with the World War the corporate device was used in several
instances, although the reason for this use of corporations instead of the
more usual governmental departments and bureaus was not entirely clear. 12
At this time the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation,' 3 the United
States Grain Corporation,'4 the United States Housing Corporation,' 5 the
War Finance Corporation,' 6 the Sugar Equalization Board, 17 the Spruce
Production Corporation,' 8 and the Russian Bureau, Incorporated,'" were
formed. After the War and up until 1931 the United States established
the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks 20 and the Inland Waterways Cor-
poration. 21 The more recent government corporations will be classified
functionally in order to facilitate a discussion of the problems involved.
22
Corporations Concerned zuith Credit and Finance
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created by act of Con-
gress early in 1932.23 It is authorized to aid in financing agriculture,
8. 32 STAT. 481, 484 (1902), 31 U. S. C. A. § 744 (1934). For litigation involving this
corporation, see Panama R. R. v. Minnix, 282 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); Rogers v.
Graves, 57 Sup. Ct. 259 (U. S. 1937) (holding that the salary received by an employee of
the Panama Railroad Company was immune from state taxation).
9. DIMOCK, GOVERNmENT-OPERATED ENTERPRISES IN THE PANAMtA CANAL ZONE (1934).
10. 38 STAT. 305 (914), 48 U. S. C. A. §§3O1-3o8 (1934).
ii. Ballaine v. Alaska N. Ry., 259 Fed. 183 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
12. Reed, Governnent-owned Business Corporations (1935) 2 U. S. L. WEEK 1039.
13. The United States Shipping Board was created by 39 STAT. 729 (i9i6), 46 U. S. C.
A. § 8o4 (1934). It in turn incorporated the Fleet Corporation under the laws of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
14. Created by ExEc. ORDER NO. 2681, Aug. 14, 1917, resulting from the general language
of the Food Control Act. See VAN DORN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 81.
I5. Organized by the Secretary of Labor under the Laws of New York in 1918. Id.
at 139.
16. Created by Congress, 40 STAT. 5o6 (I918), 15 U. S. C. A. §§331-373 (934).
17. Created by Herbert Hoover as Food Administrator in igiS under the laws of Dela-
ware with the approval of the President. VAN DORN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 178.
I8. The corporation was authorized by Congress, but was chartered under the laws of
the State of Washington by the Director of Aircraft Production. Id. at 249.
ig. Incorporated in Connecticut by the War Trade Board in 1918. Id. at 255.
20. 42 STAT. 1454 (1923), 12 U. S. C. A. § IO2I (1934).
21. 43 STAT. 360 (1924), 49 U. S. C. A. § 153 (1934).
22. For a more detailed survey of the New Deal government corporations see Culp,
Creation of Government Corporations by the National Government (1935) 33 MICE. L. REv.
473 (excerpts from the certificates of incorporation of the various New Deal corporations);
Mcntire, supra note 7.
23. 47 STAT. 5 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. §6oi (Supp. 1936). The 75th Congress passed a
bill to create a corporation designed to be subsidiary to the R. F. C. to render relief in the
flood-stricken areas by means of unsecured loans. As yet the bill has not been signed.
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banking, commerce, industry, state insurance funds, and states and munici-
palities. The Commodity Credit Corporation was incorporated under the
laws of Delaware pursuant to an executive order."4 It is authorized to deal
in agricultural or other commodities, to loan on them, to encourage farmers
in marketing, and to do anything designed to carry out the purposes of the
N. R. A. 25  Both of the Export-Import Banks of Washington were organ-
ized by executive order under the laws of the District of Columbia.2 6  They
carry on a general banking business designed to facilitate exports and im-
ports. The Tennessee Valley Associated Cooperatives, Inc., was created
under the laws of Tennessee by three directors of the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority. The purpose of the corporation is "' to promote, organize, estab-
lish, manage, finance, coordinate, and assist in any way whatsoever' in the
development of cooperative enterprises in the Tennessee Valley Authority
area." 27
Several government corporations were created to aid agricultural recon-
struction, among which are the Farm Mortgage Corporation, 2  Production
Credit Corporations,2 9 the Central Bank for Cooperatives, 30 and Regional
Banks for Cooperatives. 31 For the aid of the home owner there is the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation,3 2 which subscribes to the stock of the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,3 3 its purpose being to insure the
accounts of eligible building and loan associations. In the same category
are the Federal Home Loan Banks,34 Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tions, 35 National Mortgage Associations, 6 and Federal Credit Unions.
37
Corporations Concerned with Development and Relief
The Tennessee Valley Authority is perhaps the most important agency
under this heading. Formed by act of Congress in 1933,8 it is intended to
be a permanent agency. The Authority has formed under the laws of Dela-
ware the Electric Farm and Home Authority, Inc., which is a subsidiary
mortgage-loan company of the T. V. A.3 9 Another corporation coming
24. ExEc. ORDER No. 6340, Oct. 17, 1933.
25. Cert. of Incorp., Art. 3, in Culp, supra note 22, at 484, n. 23.
26. ExEc. ORDER No. 6581, Feb. 2, 1934; EXEC. ORDER No. 6638, Mar. 9, '934.
27. U. S. GOV'T MANUAL (1935) 285.
28. 48 STAT. 344 (934), 12 U. S. C. A. § o2o (1934).
29. 48 STAT. 257 (933), 12 U. S. C. A. §1131 (934).
30. 48 STAT. 261 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1134 (1934).
31. 48 STAT. 257 (933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1134 (934).
32. 48 STAT. 129 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1463 (934).
33. 48 STAT. 1256 (934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1725 0934).
34. 47 STAT. 726 (1932), 12 U. S. C. A. 1 423 (934) ; see s U. S. L. WEEK (934) 648.
35. 48 STAT. 132 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1464 (934) ; see (933) x U. S. L. WEEK 182.
36. 48 STAT. 1252 (934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1716 (1934).
37. 48 STAT. 1216 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1752 0934).
38. 48 STAT. 58 (933), 16 U. S. C. A. § 831 (Supp. 1936).
39. Subsequently reorganized under the laws of the District of Columbia.
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within this classification is the Federal Subsistence Homesteads Corporation,
created under the laws of Delaware by order of the Secretary of the Interior
in 1933. The purpose of this corporation is "To aid the redistribution of
the overbalance of population in industrial centers by making loans for and
otherwise aiding in the purchase of subsistence homesteads." 4 ' Differing
somewhat from these corporations is the Prison Industries Corporation
which was formed by the Attorney General under the laws of the District of
Columbia pursuant to statutory authority to conduct various industries in
the Federal prisons. This is a very important Federal corporation and is
unique in that the statute authorizing its incorporation specifically provides
that its expenditures shall be made so far as practicable in accordance with
the law governing other expenditures by the Federal departments and estab-
lishments of the United States.4 1  In any discussion concerning the power
of the Federal Government to create corporations we must always bear in
mind the oft-repeated fundamental of constitutional law that the Federal
Government is one of delegated powers.* It must be taken as settled that
the Federal Government has the power to create a corporation for the pur-
pose of carrying out the powers given to it by the Constitution. The well-
known case of McCulloch v. Maryland 43 first laid down the principle that,
although the words "bank" or "incorporation" did not appear in the Con-
stitution, the Congress was justified in creating a corporation as a means
for executing the enumerated powers.
Since it is proper for Congress to create corporations for the execution
of its enumerated powers, the next question is just what kind of government
corporations may Congress create? The few cases on the subject tell us
that the Federal Government may incorporate private corporations to con-
struct a bridge between two states,44 to build railroads, 45 to establish national
banks 46 and to construct a canal in the District of Columbia.
47  It is im-
portant to remember that these corporations were not controlled by the gov-
ernment and were not for the exercise of Federal power. The manage-
ment was left to private individuals and the corporations were operated for
profit. Apparently there have been only two cases bearing directly upon the
question of the power of Congress to create government corporations in
the sense of government-managed corporations. The first, as already indi-
cated, was McCulloch v. Maryland. The other was Smith v. Kansas City
40. Cert. of Incorp., art. 3. For copies of this and several other charters see 79 CONG.
REc. 1552-1561 (1935).
4. 48 STAT. 1211 (1934), I8 U. S. C. A. § 744 (Supp. 1936).
42. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. i, 63 (1936).
43. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
44. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 (1894).
45. California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. I (1888).
46. Farmers' and Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U. S. 29 (i875).
47. Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91 (U. S. 1838).
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Title & Trust Company,4 8 where Congress had chartered Federal Land
Banks under federal law,49 the government then holding part of the stock
temporarily. The government had majority control of the board of direc-
tors, 50 so that it was properly to be classed as a government corporation. The
Court sustained the power of Congress to create such banks saying:
"Since the decision of the great cases of McCulloch v. Maryland
• . . and Osborn v. Bank . . . , it is no longer an open question that
Congress may establish banks for national purposes, only a small part
of the capital of which is held by the Government, and a majority of
the ownership in which is represented by shares of capital stock pri-
vately owned and held; the principal business of such banks being
private banking conducted with the usual methods of such business." 51
The holding was based almost entirely upon the fact that the banks were
authorized to act as depositories of public money and as a market for
United States Bonds. 52 The Court expressly overruled the contention that
the designation of these banks as fiscal agents and public depositories of
the government was a mere pretext and that they had not been actually used
as such, declaring that when Congress was acting within the limits of its
constitutional authority it was not within the province of the Court to inquire
into its motives.
53
If, then, the principle enunciated in this decision were carried to its
logical conclusion, it would seem that Congress could constitutionally create
a corporation for almost any purpose by merely providing that .the corpora-
tion should act as a fiscal agent of the government. A glance at the laws
creating a few of these corporations will demonstrate that this point has not
been .overlooked. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is to act as a
financial agent of the United States and as a depository for public moneys
when so designated by the Secretary of the Treasury, 54 as are also the Fed-
eral Home Loan Banks,85 Federal savings and loan associations and mem-
bers of any Federal Home Loan Bank, 56 the Federal Savings and Loan
48. 255 U. S. 18o (1921). In Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 209
(1936), involving the taxability under Maryland law of shares of stock owned by the R. F. C.
in the Baltimore National Bank, the Court did not decide the constitutionality of the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation. "We assume, though without deciding even by indirection,
that within McCulloch v. Maryland . . . a corporation so conceived and operated is an
instrumentality of government without distinction in that regard between one activity and
another." Id. at 211.
49. 39 STAT. 362 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. § 671 (1934).
50. 39 STAT. 366 (1916), 12 U. S. C. A. §678 (1934).
51. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. I8o, 208 (1921).
52. Id. at 211.
53. Id. at 21o.
54. 47 STAT. 10 (932), 15 U. S. C. A. §612 (Supp. 1936).
55. 47 STAT. 736 (1932), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1434 (1934).
56. 48 STAT. 132 (933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1464 (k) (1934).
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Insurance Corporation,5 7 the Federal Credit Unions,5 8 the National Mort-
gage Associations,5" the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 0 the Cen-
tral Bank for Cooperatives, the Production Credit Corporations, Production
Credit Associations, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, and Banks
for Cooperatives. 61 It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the Court
will sustain all of the congressional enactments creating these corporations
merely on the ground that they are fiscal agents and depositories of public
funds. In at least one notable case 11 the Court was not blinded by the fact
that Congress had designated a penalty as a tax. Of course the argument
does carry considerable weight when applied to government corporations
which actually are useful in carrying out the fiscal powers of the govern-
ment, such as the Bank of the United States. Thus an examination of each
particular corporation from a functional viewpoint is required in order that
its constitutional propriety may be ascertained. It is a question not of Con-
gressional motive but of what Congress has actually done. Congress cannot
preclude judicial scrutiny by a mere declaration or by a legislative finding.
63
And the Court will probably not be very much impressed by the stereotyped
paragraphs designating these various corporations as fiscal agents when in
fact they are not. A great many of the recent government-owned corpora-
tions are principally concerned with finance and credit. It reasonably may
be urged that these can be sustained under the power of Congress to coin
money and to regulate its value. 64 This would necessarily require a holding
that Congress can regulate the nation's credit in order that the value of
money may be fully regulated. Government corporations lending money
and also those insuring bank accounts may be held necessary and proper to
the maintenance of a sound monetary system.
Those government corporations which are not engaged with financing
and the extension of credit but which were formed with an eye toward the
regulation of private business or the providing of relief require a different
justification. This class would include T. V. A., the Federal Subsistence
Homesteads Corporation, the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation,
the Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation, and the Prison Indus-
tries Corporation. The Court has sustained the power of Congress to incor-
porate interstate railways 65 and to create a corporation to build an interstate
57. 48 STAT. 1256 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1725 (d) (1934).
58. 48 STAT. 1222 (I934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1767 (1934).
59. 48 STAT. 1255 (i934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1723 (1934).
60. 48 STAT. 168 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. §264 (n) (1934).
61. 48 STAT. 267 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1138 (a) (1934).
62. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
63. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 5' (1936).
64. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
65. California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1 (I888).
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bridge 66 under the commerce power.67 But it has also held that the genera-
tion of electricity is not interstate commerce although it immediately crosses
state lines.6 8 And the activities of the Public Works Emergency Housing
Corporation are even further removed from interstate commerce since houses
generally have a fixed locale.
The activities of some government corporations may be justified under
the much discussed general welfare clause.69 Without discussing the differ-
ent theories in respect to this clause, suffice it to say that the Court has spe-
cifically adopted the interpretation placed upon it by Hamilton, as opposed
to the view taken by Madison.70 Thus Congress has the power to spend
money for the general welfare and is not limited by the grant of enumerated
powers. 7 1  The only qualification of this spending power is that it must
be limited to public purposes. For instance, the power to lay taxes for the
common defence and the general welfare could not be constitutionally em-
ployed for the purpose of "propogating Mohammedanism among the
Turks". 72  But just what constitutes a "public purpose" as distinguished
from a "private purpose" was not settled by the only case discussing this
clause. 73  However, we do know that if a government corporation is to be
sustained under the clause, it must be a spending agency of the Federal Gov-
ernment. Here, as in the discussion of the authority of Congress to create
corporations under the fiscal powers, we must be careful not to let the
pretext of words impress the stamp of validity upon an unconstitutional
activity. Assuming, then, that Congress may validly create corporations
under the spending power, how about corporations which are conducted
on a commercial basis in which the United States holds the stock? Congress
cannot be said to be spending money when it appropriates money to buy
stock, since presumably the stock has some value.74  This differs greatly
66. Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525 (1894).
67. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932).
69. U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. I : "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States; .
70. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 66 (1936).
71. "While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are set in the clause
which confers it, and not in those of section 8 which bestow and define the legislative powers
of the Congress. It results that the power of Congress to authorize expenditures of public
moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in
the Constitution." Ibid.
72. See I STORY, CONSTITUTION (5th ed., 189i) § 922.
73. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 68 (1936) : "We are not now required to ascer-
tain the scope of the phrase 'general welfare of the United States' or to determine whether
an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it." The court here adopted the view urged
by the author in The New Deal and the Public Money (935) 23 GEO. L. J. 155, that the
Hamiltonian and not the Madisonian theory was correct as to the constitutional authority of
the Congress to appropriate public money, with which compare Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
decided May 1O, 1937, by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See also
Brabner-Smith, The Hoosac Mills Case and Our Founding Fathers (1936) 25 GEo. L. 3.
48, s.
74. United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 322 (U. S. 1872).
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from giving grants in aid to the states7 5 A government corporation which
is operated upon a profit-making basis for the benefit of the United States
as shareholder could scarcely be called a spending agency.
70
Incorporation under State Statutes
We have yet to consider those corporations created pursuant to execu-
tive order under the general incorporation laws of various states. 7 The
authority of the Executive to create government corporations under state
law is said to be found in statutes authorizing him to establish such agencies
as he may find necessary. Thus, under Title II of the N. R. A.78 it was pro-
vided that, in order to effectuate the purposes of the act, " . . . the President
is hereby authorized . . . to establish such agencies . . . as he may find nec-
essary . ," 79 The Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation, cre-
ated under the laws of Delaware, was established pursuant to an Executive
Order under the authority of this section 80 In view of some recent pro-
nouncements from high authority concerning the delegation of power,81 ques-
tions may well be raised as to such procedure. In the Schechter case a similar
problem was discussed. The President was to make a finding that a code
"will tend to effectuate the policy of this title." The Court said, "While
this is called a finding, it is really but a statement of an opinion as to the
general effect upon the promotion of trade or industry of a scheme of
laws." 82 So if the President believed that a corporation would effectuate
the purpose of the Act, he could establish one upon his own motion with-
75. E. g., the Maternity Act, 42 STAT. 224 (1921), 42 U. S. C. A. § 16I (1928), which
authorized appropriations from the national treasury to be apportioned among such states as
should accept and comply with its provisions, for the purpose of cooperating with them to re-
duce maternal and infant mortality, and to protect the health of mother and infants. See
BECK, OUR WONDERLAND OF BuREAucRAcY (1932) 197, 209.
76. This ought to hold true even where there is no stock issued, as in T. V. A., since
stock is supposed to represent, in some degree, the actual or potential value of a company.
77. E. g., the Commodity Credit Corporation, chartered under the laws of Delaware.
ExEc. ORDER No. 6340, Oct. 17, 1933.
78. 48 STAT. 200 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §4Ol (Supp. 1936).
79. 48 STAT. 200 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §4O (a) (Supp. 1936). See also 48 STAT. 205
(1933), 40 U. S. C. A. § 408 (Supp. 1936), in which $25,000,000 is made available to the
President to provide for aiding the redistribution of the overbalance of population in indus-
trial centers, the money ". . . to be used by him through such agencies as he may estab-
lish . . ." Pursuant to order of the Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 2, 1933) the Federal
Subsistence Homestead Corporation was created under Delaware laws. The Secretary
of the Interior received his authority by virtue of an Executive Order delegating to him the
power to "establish such agencies . . . as he may find necessary . . ." EXEC. ORDER No.
6252, Aug. 19, 1933.
So. Exuc. ORDER No. 6470, Nov. 29, 1933.
81. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (935) ; Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (935) ; see also Franklin v. Tugwell, 85 F. (2d) 208 (App.
D. C. 1936), holding the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 unconstitutional as an
invalid delegation of powers. But cf. the opinions of the same court in Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes and Iowa City Light & Power Co. v. Ickes, decided May 1o, 1937.
82. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 538 (1935). See McGuire,
Administrative Lawmaking (1936) 185 ANNAxas 73, 84; Report of the Special Committee on
Administrative Law (1936) 61 A. B. A. REP. 72o.
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out an administrative agency to assist him, as was the case in approving
codes of fair competition.8 3  It is plain that the statute did not require
the President to make findings of fact before establishing a government cor-
poration under Title II of the N. R. A. Nor was he required to make any
statement as to his reasons for establishing a corporation. The power to
establish agencies does not require that a corporation be established. An
"agency" could easily be any of the many other forms of business associa-
tions. The essence of Title II of the N. R. A. was to prepare and finance,
through any agency he might create, a vast system of public works.8 4 The
President could construct, finance or aid any public works project included in
the public works program. He had unfettered discretion in choosing any
number, type, or class of agency. Moreover he was not directed to establish
agencies but rather was permitted to do so if he chose. Such a roving com-
mission to pick and choose was condemned in the Schechter 8 5 and Panama 88
cases.
It may also be questioned whether Congress intended that the President
should have power to create a corporation rather than the usual form of
government commission or board when it authorized him to establish such
agencies as he should find necessary. This is particularly important in view
of the difference in legal status between a government corporation and a
government department.8 7  The point has never been judicially decided in
spite of the fact that several similar war-time corporations were involved in
litigation. The Attorney General is of the opinion that under Title II of
the N. I. R. A. the President not only has the power to create government
corporations but that he may create them under the laws of a state.88 On
the other hand, in a letter to the Federal Emergency Administrator of Public
Works, Comptroller General McCarl stated that there was room for doubt on
the matter, but that in order not to place any unnecessary restraint on those
administering the law he felt justified in withholding objections.8 9 The
Attorney General took the position that, since Congress knew of the practice
of the President's establishing corporations by executive order during the
War, they must be deemed to have vested this measure of discretion in the
President.
Viewing the matter in its fundamental aspect, the national government
is allowing the state government to create a federal instrumentality whose
powers and duties are determined by the laws of the state of incorporation.
83. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 539 (1935).
84. 48 STAT. 201 (1933), 40 U. S. C. A. §§402, 403 (Supp. 1936).
85. 295 U. S. 495, 538 (935).
86. 293 U. S. 388, 432 (1935).
87. See United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. I (1927).
88. 37 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (1934) 437.
89. 78 CONG. REc. 1053 (1934).
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This opens up a vast field of conflict of laws necessarily incident to such a
use of a state corporation. It would seem that uniformity is even more to be
desired in the structure of government than in the field of maritime law.90
It is true that Congress can expressly adopt the provisions of various state
laws upon certain subjects,91 but in the cases of corporations formed under
state laws, Congress has said merely that the President may establish such
agencies "as he may find necessary". If constitutionally a federally owned
and controlled corporation may be organized under state laws, may such
corporations operate in states other than the original state? And may the
Federal Government go to the states for additional power otherwise than in
the prescribed mode for constitutional amendment? 92
Recently the Court held that the conversion of a state building and
loan association into a federal association was of no effect as against the
protest of the state.93 The building and loan association was classed as
"quasi-public" but much of the reasoning may be applicable to ordinary cor-
porations. The Court said:
"Wisconsin, planning these agencies (building and loan associa-
tions) in furtherance of the common good and purposing to preserve
them that the good may not be lost, is now informed by the Congress,
speaking through a statute, that the purpose and the plan shall be
thwarted and destroyed. By the law of the state, associations such as
these may be dissolved in ways and for the causes carefully defined, in
which event the assets shall be converted into money and applied, so far
as adequate, to the payment of the creditors. By the challenged Act of
Congress, the same associations are dissolved in other ways and for
other causes, and from being creatures of the state become creatures
of the nation. In this there is an invasion of the sovereignty or quasi-
sovereignty of Wisconsin and an impairment of its public policy, which
the state is privileged to redress as a suitor in the courts so long as the
Tenth Amendment preserves a field of autonomy against Federal en-
croachment." 9'
go. Cf. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920), holding invalid an act
of Congress making workmen's compensation laws of the several states applicable to injuries
received in maritime work.
91. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 12 How. 298 (U. S. 1851) ; Clark Distilling Co. v. West-
ern Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
92. The President's Committee on Administrative Management in the Government of the
United States reported that: "In times of war and other national emergency, corporations
have been chartered under the laws of the several States by executive officers of the Govern-
ment to further some activity authorized by legislation.
"There are great advantages in certainty of operation if the Federal charter is used
wherever possible. There is grave question as to the advisability of the continued use of
State charters by the Federal Government and further study of this problem is recommended.
There is reason to believe that unnecessary conflicts of State and Federal jurisdiction are
engendered and that the use of the State charters threatens the Federal Government with the
impairment or destruction of its control over its instrument in the face of State hostility.
Considerable uncertainty and litigation have undoubtedly arisen in this connection." SEN.
Doc. No. 8, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (1937) 75.
93. Hopkins Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315 (935).
94. Id. at 337.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Whatever else the case stands for, it does stand for the fact that a state
has some rights in the corporations created under its own laws. If this is
true, what about the other states which have not consented to the invasion
of the Federal Government except in accordance with the power delegated to
it in the Constitution? However, the National Government would be sub-
mitted to state restrictions by the creation of government corporations under
state law. This would appear inconsistent with the theory that the Federal
Government should have exclusive power over its own instrumentalities.
The question as to the power of removal of directors of corporations
which the President has caused to be created by executive order may become
of great practical importance. While in practice, the directors usually
occupy some other office in the executive branch of the government, this
is not a legal requirement. This is an undeveloped field of government-
owned corporations, and it remains to be seen whether the President can
remove, or control such officers in any way not expressly provided by the
statute creating the corporation. If the directors are also executive officers,
he might remove them as executive officers, but could he remove them as
officers of the corporation when the statute of its creation does not so pro-
vide? As to those corporations which are created directly by Act of Con-
gress and whose directors are appointed by the President by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate,95 the President could not remove them
at his pleasure 96 unless authority to that effect was contained in the statute
of their creation.
Could a government corporation formed under the laws of a state oper-
ate in other states without their consent? No cases involving the precise
point have been discovered, but probably it could not if the corporation were
performing functions of the Federal Government and the other states were
objecting. However, in a case involving the power of a state to require
a foreign corporation to take out a license as a condition to doing business
within the state the Court said:
"The only limitation upon this power of the State to exclude a
foreign corporation from doing business within its limits, or hiring
offices for that purpose, or to exact conditions for allowing the corpora-
95. The Act creating the R. F. C. also establishes a definite term of two years for the di-
rectors and specifies that not more than four of the seven directors may be members of the
same political party. 47 STAT. 5 (932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6o3 (Supp. 1936).
96. The President may not remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission at will.
Humphrey's Exec. v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2 (1935). The act under which the com-
missioners are appointed resembles very closely the act creating the R. F. C. The reasoning
in the Humphrey case should apply since the officers are not performing strictly executive
duties. The President's Committee on Administrative Management in the Government of
the United States recommended that: "All Government corporations should likewise be
brought under supervision and control through transfer into regular departments. They
should be established therein as semi-autonomous divisions, with extensions to them of such
budgetary, financial, and personnel supervision or control as may be appropriate in any given
case." SEN. Doc. No. 8, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. (1937) 76.
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tion to do business or hire offices there, arises where the corporation
is in the employ of the federal government, or where its business is
strictly commerce, interstate or foreign. The control of such commerce,
being in the federal government, is not to be restricted by state author-
ity." 9
In Arizona v. California 98 the Court held that the United States has
power to construct a dam across a navigable river in order to improve navi-
gation and need not first obtain approval of its plans by the state in which
the dam is to be located, even though this be expressly required by a statute
of the state. The State of Utah considers the R. F. C. Mortgage Company,
a Maryland corporation, as a federal governmental agency, and hence it is
not required to pay the taxes and fees usually required of foreign corpora-
tions.99
There is little doubt but that a federally owned state corporation may
be sued in state courts since the state laws provide for suits against corpora-
tions 100 and since corporations created by direct act of Congress may be
made subject to suit.101 Some of the war-time corporations chartered under
state laws have been held liable to suit. One of the most important cases to
this effect is Sloan Shipyards Corporation v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation.10 2  Here an action was brought against the
Fleet Corporation for breach of contract. The District Court held that it
was in reality a suit against the United States and should therefore have
been brought in the Court of Claims, but the Supreme Court held that the
suit could be brought in the ordinary national and state courts just as though
it were a suit against a private corporation. Numerous cases have since held
government corporations chartered under state law liable to suit.103 What-
ever the reasons advanced for holding them so liable, the rules governing the
fair transaction of business require that when the government deals with indi-
97. Mr. Justice Field in Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, Igo (i887).
98. 283 U. S. 423 (1931). The Court there said (at 451-452), "The United States may
perform its functions without conformity to the police regulations of a State."
99. Op. Att'y Gen. of Utah, June 5, 1935. C. C. H. Bank L. Serv. 13,5o8. A similar
conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court of the United States in Rogers v. Graves, 57
Sup. Ct. 259 (U. S. 1937), as to the unconstitutionality of a state tax on income earned by
counsel for the Panama Railroad Company.
ioo. See Puget Sound Mach. Depot v. United States Shipping Bd. Emer. Fleet Corp.,
293 Fed. 768 (W. D. Wash. 1923); Haines v. United States Shipping Bd. Emer. Fleet Corp.,
268 Pa. 92, iio Atl. 788 (1920), 275 Pa. 260, 118 Atl. 9o9 (1922).
rol. Inland Waterways Corp., 43 STAT. 360 (1924), 49 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1928) ; R. F.
C., 47 STAT. 5 (932), 15 U. S. C. A. § 6oi (Supp. 1936) ; T. V. A., 48 STAT. 58 (I933), 16
U. S. C. A. §831 (Supp. 1936) ; F. D. I. C., 49' STAT. 684 (1935), 12 U. S. C. A. §264
(Supp. 1936) ; Fed. Farm Mortgage Corp., 48 STAT. 334 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1020 (Supp.
1936).
102. 258 U. S. 549 (1922).
1O3. See Schnell, Federally Ozned Corporations and Their Legal Problems (1935) 14
N. C. L. Ray. 238, 337; Thurston, Governmtt Proprietary Corporations (935) 21 VA. L.
REv. 351, 465.
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viduals on a commercial basis there should be no undue advantage given to
one of the parties.10 4
A more interesting question is whether a state chartered federal cor-
poration should be allowed to remove a suit to a federal court on the ground
that it is a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States.10 5 The judicial code provides that "No district court shall have
jurisdiction of any action or suit by or against any corporation upon the
ground that it was incorporated by or under an Act of Congress. This sec-
tion shall not apply to any suit, action, or proceeding brought by or against
a corporation incorporated by or under an Act of Congress wherein the
Government of the United States is the owner of more than one-half of its
capital stock." 106 The stock of a state-chartered government corporation is
generally wholly owned by the United States, but the section quoted does
not confer absolute federal jurisdiction of cases involving government owned
corporations.10 7  The other requisites of federal jurisdiction must therefore
appear.
In the recent case of Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian' 38
this question of federal jurisdiction based on the ground of a suit arising
under the Constitution and laws of the United States was carefully treated.
The Bank in Meridian had taken over the assets of the Bank of Meridian
under a contract whereby the debts and liabilities of the insolvent grantor
were assumed by the grantee. Among the liabilities so assumed were moneys
owing the state tax collector, for which he brought suit in the courts of Mis-
sissippi. A petition for removal was filed by the bank on the ground that it
was a suit arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
The Circuit Court of Appeals so held, but the Supreme Court reversed this
holding, stating that the suit was built upon a contract whose obligation had
lo4. "If the sovereign thus chooses as its agent a state corporation which can be sued it
cannot ipse dixit deprive one injured of the right to sue. The State of Delaware allowed de-
fendant to be created, but as a condition of its creation and existence it afforded the right to
anyone to sue the corporate being which it thus created." ". . . when the sovereign uses
an agency created not by itself but under a state statute, he takes his agent as he finds it."
Hand, J., in Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 Fed.
575, 584, 586 (S. D. N. Y. 192o). See also Gould Coupler Co. v. United States Shipping Bd.
Emer. Fleet Corp., 261 Fed. 716, 718 (S. D. N. Y. 1919) : "Moreover it is in general highly
desirable that, in entering upon industrial and commercial ventures, the governmental agen-
cies used should, whenever it can fairly be drawn from the statutes, be subject to the same
liabilities and to the same tribunals as other persons or corporations similarly employed.
The immunity of the sovereign may well become a serious injustice to the citizen, if it can
be claimed in the multitude of cases arising from governmental activities which are increasing
so fast."
lO5. Some other important questions of federal jurisdiction are: Are federal corporations
of states to be considered as citizens of the state in order to give diversity? Olson v. United
States Spruce Production Corp., 267 U. S. 462 (1925). How should venue of actions be
determined? Panama R. R. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557 (1926); Wallace v. United States
Shipping Bd. Emer. Fleet Corp., 5 F. (2d) 234 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
io6. 43 STAT. 941 (1925), 28 U. S. C. A. §42 (1927).
107. Belcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 3 Fed. Supp. 809 (W. D. Tex. 1933).
1o8. 57 Sup. Ct. 96 (1936).
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its genesis in the law of Mississippi and that there was no connection between
the enforcement of such a contract and the existence of a controversy under
the federal law. The Bank also argued that the Mississippi tax was upon a
national bank and would be void unless permitted by Congress. The Court
held that, although there is a federal law permitting such taxation, this does
not create a question arising under federal law, the federal law being "evi-
dence to prove the statute valid." 109 The Court reaffirmed the test laid
down in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,1" 0 saying" 'The federal nature of the
right to be established is decisive-not the source of the authority to estab-
lish it.' Here the right to be established is one created by the state. If that
is so, it is unimportant that federal consent is the source of state authority.
To reach the underlying law we do not travel back so far." 1
It would therefore seem that an ordinary lawsuit against a federal cor-
poration chartered under state law would not be such a suit arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States as to be removable from a state
to a federal court. When these corporations enter into contracts with indi-
viduals the obligations of such contracts are fixed by the state law. When
Congress used the incorporation laws of a state, it should be held to have
consented to suit in the state courts."1 2 Nor would such a holding be incon-
sistent with the rule that a suit by a corporation by a direct act of
Congress is one within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Moreover,
both Congress and the Court have manifested a desire to restrict this rule
even in suits against federally chartered corporations. 113
One of the most difficult problems in the entire field is that of the power
of a state to tax a federal corporation formed under state law. It is funda-
mental, of course, that a federal instrumentality is immune from state taxa-
tion, 14 unless Congress has consented to the tax."z5  Although there are
cases involving the taxability of federally incorporated railways 1:6 and
log. Id. at 99.
H1O. 288 U. S. 476 (1933).
III. 57 Sup. Ct. 96, at 99. Much of our social legislation is intimately connected with
this problem. Shortly after the passage of the Social Security Act the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue ruled that the employees of National Banks are "instrumentalities" of the
Federal Government. XV Int. Rev. Bull., No. 3o, at 30 (1936). Also, at a later date he
decided that employees of state banks affiliated with the Federal Reserve System likewise do
not come within the terms of the Social Security Statute. XV Int. Rev. Bull., No. 4o, at 15
(1936). All that is necessary to take the other state banks out of the said law is for them
to affiliate with the Federal Reserve System.
112. "It is alleged that, upon 'the direction' of the President, defendant was incorpo-
rated. . . . Neither the Executive nor any person acting with authority under him had the
power to change the obligations, rights or liabilities of a corporation which was the creature
of the statute; i. e., the creature of the sovereign state of Delaware." Federal Sugar Refining
Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., 268 Fed. 575, 584 (S. D. N. Y. 192o).
113. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U. S. 476, 485 (1933).
114. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. i8ig).
115. Baltimore Nat'l Bank v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 209, 211 (1936).
I16. Thompson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall. 579 (U. S. 1869) ; Railroad v. Peniston, 18 Wall.
5 (U. S. 1873).
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banks 117 by the states, these cases are scarcely applicable to the present ques-
tion since the businesses were privately owned. The cases most nearly
applicable are those involving the attempts of states to tax war-time federal
corporations formed under state laws. The Court consistently refused to
allow state taxation of these national agencies. However, the language in
these cases is notable for the emphasis placed on the existence of a war-time
emergency. For this reason a great deal of caution should be used in apply-
ing the reasoning of those cases to modern government corporations engaged
in commercial activities.
In Clallam County v. United States I'l the Court held an attempt by
the county to tax the property of the Spruce Production Corporation invalid.
The corporation was a Washington corporation whose stock was held by
the United States. The State sought to justify the tax on the ground that
although taxation of the agency may be taxation of the means employed by
the government and hence invalid, taxation of the property of the agent is
not necessarily taxation of the means. The Court answered this contention
by saying:
"But it may be, and in our opinion clearly is when as here not only
the agent was created but all the agent's property was acquired and
used, for the sole purpose of producing a weapon for the war. This is
not like the case of a corporation having its own purposes as well as
those of the United States and interested in profit on its own account.
The incorporation and formal erection of a new personality was only
for the United States to carry out its ends." -19
In United States Spruce Production Corporation v. Lincoln County 120 a
county tax levied on the property of the Spruce Corporation was held invalid,
the Court saying that although some cases had permitted state taxation of
a federal corporation, in this instance the property of the Spruce Corpora-
tion was itself the very means through which the corporation was able to
perform the functions required by the government. The court also held that
if property is exempt where the title is in the United States (principal) it
is also exempt when the title stands in the name of the Spruce Corporation
(agent) .121 In New Brunnwick v. United States 12 2 the Court held that
land standing in the name of the United States Housing Corporation (a
state corporation) could not be taxed by the city, even though the corporation
held the title only for purposes of security.
117. Owensboro Nat'l Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664 (1899) ; Smith v. Kansas City
Title and Trust Co., 255 U. S. 18o (1921).
118. 263 U. S. 341 (1923).
119. Id. at 344-345.
120. 285 Fed. 388 (D. Ore. 1922).
121. Id. at 39o. For a full list of cases holding alleged agencies of the United States not
exempt from taxation and holding the tax void, see Schlosser v. Welch, 5 Fed. Supp. 993,
999-1OOl (D. S. D. 1934).
122. 276 U. S. 542 (1928).
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Thus we have at least two Supreme Court cases holding that local
taxing authorities may not impose taxes on these "weapons for the war"
even though they came into being via state incorporation laws. But, as was
stated before, the reasoning of these cases may not apply to present day
"federal-state" corporations, especially where they are not engaged in carry-
ing out strictly Federal governmental functions. One ground upon which
these corporations may well be held liable to state taxation is that the national
government has used the same method of creating a corporation as private
persons would have done. Thus the corporation is a creature of the state as
well as of the United States. 2 3  The United States has descended to the
level of private incorporators and is therefore subject to the laws of the
incorporating state. If Congress had wished to confer sovereign privi-
leges on these agencies it would have incorporated them directly as it has
done in many cases. Chief Justice Marshall once remarked: "It is, we think,
a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading
company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that com-
pany, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead
of communicating to the company its privileges and prerogatives, it descends
to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be trans-
acted." 124 Although this statement was made in reference to the liability to
suit of a corporation in which the State of Georgia was a stockholder to-
gether with some private individuals, nevertheless the argument would have
force in regard to state taxation of state incorporated federal corporations.
Furthermore, the principle holds true not only where a government is par-
ticipating with private persons in a corporation, but also where the govern-
ment is the sole stockholder.
25
It has been suggested that the same principles in regard to national
taxation of state-controlled corporations should apply in the case of state
taxation of national corporations, i. e., that a distinction should be made
between governmental and commercial activities. If national corporations
are engaged in the latter they should be taxable by the states.12  This theory
finds its inception in South Carolina v. United States.-27 This case upheld
the right of the United States to impose a license tax on liquor dispensaries
in South Carolina although the business was a state monopoly and the dis-
pensaries were state agencies. The Court leaned heavily on the distinction
123. See letter from the Comptroller General to the Federal Emergency Administrator
of Public Works [78 CONG. REc. 1053 (1934)], wherein he suggests the possibility of sub-
jecting government agencies and property to state taxation. See also 33 OPs. A&'y GEN
(1923) 570.
124. Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank, 9 Wheat. 9o4, 9o7 (U. S. 1824).
125. Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318 (U. S. 1829).
126. Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations (1935) 21 VA. L. REv. 351, 482.
127. 199 U. S. 437 (1905).
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between the governmental and commercial functions of a state. The Court
also pointed out that the states might take over all industry and that if federal
license taxes could not be imposed on these businesses, the national govern-
ment would be deprived of its revenue.
While the distinction between governmental and commercial activity
may well be made in the cases of individual states, it is of doubtful weight
when applied to the national government. In other words, it is constitution-
ally proper for a state to engage in private business; but where should we find
authority for the Federal Government to operate, say, all of the shoe manu-
facturing of the United States? If in the field of state taxation of federal
corporations we allow taxes on what is commercial and disallow on what is
governmental, we may find that the commercial function is unconstitutional
before we get a chance to tax it. Further, the distinction between what is
a "proprietary" and what a "public" function is most confused in cases
concerning the tort liability of municipal corporations. Possibly the chaos
would be equally great should we seek to draw it in the field of state taxation
of federal corporations.
Either the federal corporations chartered under state law must be held
to have descended to the level of private corporations and thus to have
become taxable by the states, or they must be considered as instrumentalities
of the United States and, as such, entitled to immunity from state taxation.'
2 8
If the latter proves to be the rule, the distinction in the field of taxation
between government corporations created by direct act of Congress and
those created under state law pursuant to executive order will be negligible.
The development during the next few years of this aspect of the law of
government by corporations will be of great interest and importance.
128. There is some indication toward immunity from state taxation of federal corpora-
tions, even though organized under state laws, by the holding in Rogers v. Graves, 57
Sup. Ct. 259 (U. S. 1937), where it was held that income derived from employment
by the Panama Railroad Company was not subject to state taxation. However, the
court apparently attempted to ground its decision on the point that the railroad company was
operated as an adjunct to the Panama Canal, which was a governmental function. The rail-
road company owned a fleet of steamships and engaged in the transportation of freight from
New York to Central America for hire. It is not too much to say that this entire situation
is considerably confused, and there appears no means of knowing at this time what rule will
be finally evolved.
